SUBCOURSE
IT 0777

EDITION
B

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
LIAISON ACTIVITIES



THE ARMY INSTITUTE FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ARMY CORRESPONDENCE COURSE PROGRAM

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LIAISON ACTIVITIES

Subcourse Number IT 0777

EDITION B

United States Army Intelligence Center
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000

4 Credit Hours

Edition Date: February 1993

SUBCOURSE OVERVIEW

This subcourse is designed to teach the knowledge necessary to conduct liaison in counterintelligence (CI) investigations/operations. Contained within this subcourse is instruction on liaison priorities, establishing liaison and preparing liaison contact reports.

There are no prerequisites for this subcourse.

This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time the subcourse was prepared. In your own work situation, always refer to the latest publications.

The words "he," "him," "his," and "men," when used in this publication, represent both the masculine and feminine genders unless otherwise stated.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE

ACTION: Explain the basis and priorities for liaison, discuss personnel and organizational contact and rapport, identify procedures in preparing a liaison contact report and exchange information of mutual interest that is releasable to outside agencies.

CONDITIONS: Given narrative information and illustrations from AR 1-100, AR 381-10, AR 381-20, AR 381-141(C), FM 34-60A(S), and FM 101-5. Applicable field manuals and Army regulations.

STANDARD: To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a minimum of 70% on the subcourse examination.

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LESSON 1

LIAISON ESTABLISHMENT

MQS Annual Task: 01-3354.01-0730
Critical Tasks: 301-340-1102
301-340-2052

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn how to prepare for and establish liaison.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTIONS: Explain the priorities for liaison, discuss direct contact with selected individuals, and establish personnel and organizational rapport with the liaison contact.

CONDITIONS: You will be given narrative information and illustrations from applicable field manuals and Army regulations.

STANDARDS: Preparation for and establishment of liaison will be in accordance with AR 1-100, AR 381-10, AR 381-20, AR 381-141(C), FM 34-60A(S), FM 101-5, and local standing operating procedures (SOP).

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications:

AR 1-100
AR 381-10
AR 381-20
AR 381-141(C)
FM 34-60A(S)
FM 101-5

INTRODUCTION

In this lesson you will learn:

★ The basis for liaison.

★ The priorities of liaison.

★ The establishment of personnel contact.

★ The establishment of personnel and organizational rapport.

PART A - BASIS

Liaison is the establishment of personnel contact between a representative of one organization and individuals in staff and operating sections of other organizations for the purposes of promoting cooperation and mutual understanding; coordinating actions and activities; exchanging information and viewpoints; and obtaining information, assistance, material or access to other sources of information. Liaison may also be used to establish contact with an individual whose cooperation, assistance, or knowledge is desired.

A liaison source is an individual with whom liaison is conducted. A liaison contact is the act of visiting or otherwise contacting a liaison source.

Liaison is based on reciprocal cooperation between organizations or agencies with responsibilities, information, missions, and capabilities of mutual interest. Frequently, the information exchanged has been "sanitized.' That is, all indications of the original source have been excised. This is particularly true of information exchanged between agencies of different countries.

The conduct of liaison is normally the responsibility of designated liaison officers (LNOs) although it may be an additional duty for counterintelligence (CI) agents. In the Continental United States (CONUS), and especially in overseas areas, liaison with agencies and individuals having records and information of CI interest is essential to the success of CI investigations and operations.

The nature of CI activities and the many legal restrictions imposed, particularly the status-of-forces or other delimitations agreements, frequently make the collection of CI information dependent, to a large extent, upon the effectiveness of liaison. Liaison with appropriate United States (US), host country, and allied military and civilian agencies is fundamental to the success of CI operations. Familiarity with the mission of local agencies is probably the most essential factor to the success of the liaison mission. Liaison procedures should be established by the unit SOP. Frequently, the employment of a full-time LNO, or section, to maintain regular contact with designated military and civil agencies will be necessary.

In addition to the various national level agencies, there are numerous local agencies that may also provide assistance to CI activities and operations, both in the US and in overseas areas. CI personnel must be familiar with these agencies and the type and scope of information they can provide. Lesson 2 of this subcourse will discuss principal types and location of information often of CI interest.

PART B - PRIORITIES

Liaison priorities are based on requirements and liaison capabilities. The following factors must be considered when estimating liaison capabilities:

- ★ Particular geographic area, unit mission, resources, number and experience of available liaison personnel.
- ★ Language abilities, time, funds, political, legal, and practical limitations.
- ★ Current situation, available sources, and supported command.

Requirements include requests to other agencies and organizations for assistance, material, and information. Assistance and material requirements are normally determined locally and requested as needed. Examples are requests for indigenous personnel augmentation for operations and investigations or for equipment not otherwise available.

Information collection tasking is the most frequently levied requirement for liaison. These requirements originate at various levels of command, ranging from national level down to the local level.

While the majority of collection requirements levied on CI LNOs concern CI, there are also opportunities to develop other information, such as that pertaining to tactical or strategic military plans, operations, strengths, or incidents, or geopolitical, economic, sociological, transportation, or other nonmilitary intelligence. In some cases, an LNO may receive specific tasking to collect such information.

The collection manager considers liaison capabilities and collection requirements before establishing priorities. The highest priority goes to those agencies which can provide the most assistance.

Priorities tend to change with the situation. Unfortunately, no formula can be provided to determine priorities. The determination is a value judgement based on the current and projected situation and the mission. An intelligence priority in one situation or command may not be a priority in another situation or command. For this reason, liaison should be established with as wide a spectrum of agencies as possible.

PART C - ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONNEL CONTACT AND RAPPORT

Establishing liaison is a technique which must be developed. For example, in order to conduct CI investigations, there are certain techniques you have to develop for interviewing personnel when there is no previous contact or introduction. These same techniques will help you conduct liaison. Unlike investigations, however, liaison duties require that you continue your association with these individuals over an extended period

of time. The vast majority of these initial contacts will be made when you first assume liaison duties.

Initial Contact. There are three methods of establishing the first liaison contact:

- ★ Personal Introduction: In this method, you are introduced to the source by someone who already knows him. Most commonly, the introductions will be made by the LNO you are replacing. In some cases, however, there may not be sufficient time for you to be introduced to all of the liaison sources before your predecessor leaves. In these cases, an introduction by the assigned interpreter may suffice. In other cases, you may discover that a liaison source with whom you have already established contact has been transferred. If possible, you should request an introduction from another member of the same agency, with whom you have also previously established contact. If you are establishing contact with an agency for the first time, It may be possible to arrange to be introduced by a liaison source from another agency. A personal introduction is the preferred method of establishing contact.

- ★ Cold Approach: This is the least effective approach technique. As the name implies, the approach is made with limited preparation, to an individual who is a total stranger. Normally, it takes more time for this type of approach to be effective and it calls for maximum tact and discretion.

- ★ Letter of Introduction: The use of this method is governed by local customs. In some societies, it is a matter of protocol. While in other societies, it may be considered an insult. The letter of introduction may be signed by a US or host country official and addressed "to whom it may concern," or it may be directed to a specific individual and signed by someone who knows him well.

Regardless of how you are introduced, there are certain guidelines for initial contacts:

- ★ The initial meeting should be brief and as informal as possible, consistent with the culture and circumstances. The conversation should be primarily social, and you should generally avoid requesting assistance during this meeting. Briefly describe your mission and point out the advantages that source will incur from your visits, the good relations between your respective governments and so forth. Keeping the meeting brief precludes interrupting the liaison source's schedule any more than necessary, and allows him time to digest what you have told him.

★ When establishing contact with an organization for the first time, it is generally best to begin by meeting the highest-ranking individual in the organization, even though he may not be the one who ultimately furnishes information, material, or assistance. In many cases, the senior officer of an organization or an office may be so involved in administrative duties he does not have direct knowledge of the information you desire. Nevertheless, ensuring he is the first person contacted and making periodic calls on him help ensure continued access to his working level subordinates who can provide you assistance. Aside from the obvious courtesy involved, you avoid giving the impression his subordinates are going behind his back to help you. Establishing friendly relations with the primary supervisor also enhances the cooperation you receive from his subordinates. In some instances, you may discover a commander who has reserved the prerogative of providing information himself.

Problems may arise using the cold approach at lower echelons and isolated agencies. The individual contacted may appear to be maintaining an attitude of cool neutrality toward you. This may indicate the individual is extremely busy and wishes you would go away, but is too polite to say so. More frequently, however, it means he is unsure of how he should deal with you. If you have done your groundwork carefully and established rapport with his supervisor, he may be more willing to cooperate. In either case, you should make the meeting brief and depart after making arrangements for another meeting at a later date.

If liaison is established with an insufficient number of agencies, a personnel change may cut off the flow of information until rapport with new personnel can be established. A larger number of liaison sources also reduces dependency on any given agency, precludes overtaxing the agency's resources, and allows information from one agency to be compared with or expanded by that from another agency. Additionally, the LNO must project future requirements and establish liaison with appropriate agencies against the time their assistance will be required. Care must be taken, however, to keep from spreading liaison too thin.

Also, remember the following points in making your initial contact and in maintaining liaison:

<u>Know the Culture</u>. It is important you know the culture of the host country. What is perfectly normal and acceptable behavior in American society could very well be offensive in the host country. For example, accepting a drink with only one hand rather than two hands in some Asian countries may violate local customs. In much of the Middle East, the left hand is considered "unclean," and should never be used for food or drink. If assigned to liaison duties in a foreign country, check your Personnel and Administration Center, Army Community Service Office or other agencies to get a copy of the DA Pamphlet 360-400 series pocket guides which outline the basics of a host country's culture and language.

The DA Pamphlet 300 series, Area Studies Handbooks, are detailed studies of a host country's history, religion, weather, politics, and customs, and are available through various agencies. Local national interpreters and experienced LNOs will also be able to furnish information. Liaison sources will normally be glad to provide such information and you will find such conversations excellent for establishing rapport.

Learn the Language. It is much easier to deal with your source if you are able to speak his language rather than depend solely on the Interpreter. Even if you are not fluent, your source will appreciate the effort to learn his language and often will offer to teach you, in exchange for your helping him to learn English. There are several courses offered by Post Education Centers ranging from the basics to the advanced level. At a minimum, the LNO should learn as many polite words as possible, such as "please," "thank you,' and greeting and farewell phrases.

Avoid Embarrassing your Source. Do not ask your source for something you know or suspect he will not be able to provide. For example, if you need more personnel for an operation and your source is from a three- or four-person office, do not ask him for three or four people. Rather, explain what you are doing within the limits of regulations or unit SOP, what your requirements are, and let him offer what he can provide. A knowledge of the customs and culture goes hand-in-hand with avoiding embarrassment to your source or yourself. In many cultures, even inadvertently causing embarrassment to a guest causes "loss of face."

Liaison is a Two-Way Street. This is probably the basic tenet of liaison and simply means that liaison is reciprocal in nature. Do not always get in touch with your source because you need something, yet have nothing to offer in return. Visit him on occasion when you do not need anything, but do have something for him, such as information, an invitation to dinner, or a party. If it is just a visit, watch your timing.

Use Tact. To be successful at liaison, you must be tactful in everything you say and do with your liaison source. Never promise what you cannot reasonably expect to provide and follow through on your promises. In turn, never ask your source for something he cannot provide, thereby causing him embarrassment. Being tactful coincides with being perceptive to what your source is really saying. For example, if he says he would really like to help you with an operation, but does not have sufficient funds, he may actually be asking if your unit is willing to fund the operation. You should also be careful in your reply, since he may be using this excuse as a polite way to say no. Here again, liaison is a two-way street. If it is within your power or ability, offer your assistance.

Avoid Involvement with Corruption. If your source suggests or requests anything that is illegal, break off contact immediately. However, as suggested above, know the culture. In some parts of the world, it may be

customary to a little bribe taking as a normal part of conducting business. The LNO must be extremely careful to avoid inadvertently accepting what the source considers a bribe. There may be occasions when, due to the close personal relationship developed between the LNO and a source, that the source wishes to present a personal gift. If possible, the LNO should diplomatically refuse the gift; however, in many cases it may be necessary to accept it to maintain rapport. The LNO must be aware that such gifts must be reported in accordance with AR 1-100, and the gift can be kept only if a request to do so is submitted and approved. The same restrictions apply to the liaison officer's family members.

Do Not Play One Source Against Another. This is similar to the manipulation children use when trying to get their way. They play one parent against the other. Remember, your sources also have liaison with one another. This concept brings into play the "Third Agency Rule." Information gained from one agency is not passed on to another agency without the consent of the originating agency. Avoid mentioning what other agencies you are in contact with. Some sources may be reluctant for their association with a foreign intelligence agency to become common knowledge. If asked about other agencies, be as vague as possible. The source may be testing your discretion before deciding whether or not to cooperate.

PART D - LIAISON PERSONNEL TRAITS

In establishing a liaison program, personnel selection is of the utmost importance. Traits that liaison personnel must possess are:

Knowledge of the Customs and Culture. As discussed earlier, the LNOs knowledge in these areas is very important. Lack of knowledge of a country's customs and culture can seriously effect the liaison process.

Language Ability. Knowledge of the host country's language is desirable. The prospective LNO must have at least an ability to learn the language.

Tact. The LNO must be tactful. He cannot be like the proverbial bull-in-the-china-shop. The LNO must remember he is considered a representative of the US Government. In some cases, the source may have never encountered any other US personnel and will consider the LNO as typical.

Mission Knowledge. The LNO must know the mission of his unit before establishing contact.

Avoid Looking Down on Local Nationals. Remember, the LNO is a guest. If he has any racial or national prejudices, they will be reflected in his attitude.

Willingness. Possibly the most important trait is a willingness to become involved in liaison. The duties often call for long hours, unfamiliar

surroundings, and, if in a foreign country, lack of knowledge of the customs and culture of the country.

Adaptability. The LNO may be confronted by situations completely alien to his background. He must be able to get along with a wide variety of people by adapting his personality to build rapport with each one.

The Ability to Work Alone. It is extremely rare when there are sufficient personnel to allow more than one LNO to go on a contact. Additionally, if more than one LNO contacts a given source, confusion and working at cross purposes often results.

Retentive Memory. Information is frequently furnished verbally under conditions which make note taking impractical. In some cases, the information may be voluminous and a considerable period of time may pass before notes can be made. Frequently, sources are reluctant to provide information if written notes are being taken.

Honesty. The LNO frequently works alone and is entrusted with government funds for operational use. Intelligence contingency funds are provided under AR 381-141(C) for necessary official use for expenses of a confidential, emergency, or extraordinary nature. He must resist the temptation to "help himself" or to use funds improperly or for his own benefit.

Discretion. It is human nature to try to impress others with information that is not common knowledge. The LNO must avoid revealing sensitive information he has gained through his duties.

Broad Experience. Among other things, the LNO must be able to recognize reportable intelligence information when exposed to it even if the information is not part of a specific tasking or requirement.

PART E - SOCIAL CONTACTS

In CONUS, the vast majority of liaison is carried out on a strictly official level and largely confined to visiting the source's office. Both in CONUS and overseas, much of the success of liaison is based on the personality of the LNO and his ability to establish a pleasant relationship with the various sources.

In overseas areas, however, this relationship must be expanded to overcome the problems represented by differences in language and culture. Probably the best method of doing this is the so-called "liaison party." Liaison party refers to a social gathering between a source or several sources and the LNO or between the respective offices. They range in complexity from having a drink or a meal in a local club to a full-blown, black-tie formal event for a number of agency heads. The format of the liaison party will depend on several factors: the level at which liaison is being conducted, local customs, the presence or absence of hostilities, and relationship

between the LNO and the source(s). The objective is not so much to establish a relation, as to cement relations between the LNO and his liaison sources or between their two organizations. In the more relaxed atmosphere, the LNO can reinforce personal rapport to induce the source to consider him more than a mere professional acquaintance. Again, the objective is to enhance the ease with which information or assistance can be obtained. Special funds are normally available for these social contacts.

As with other aspects of liaison, these social contacts are normally reciprocal. Once the LNO has entertained a source and/or his subordinates, a return engagement, hosted by the source(s), is usually forthcoming. The LNO must be prepared to at least try local customs, food and drink at local restaurants, celebrations-, or other forms of entertainment. While this is highly effective in enhancing liaison, the LNO must be careful that the source does not host such functions as a substitute for the information or assistance the LNO desires.

LESSON 1

Practice Exercise

The following items will test your knowledge of the material covered in the lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. When you have completed the exercise, check your answers with the answer key that follows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that part of the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. What must personnel engaged in liaison activities remember about liaison?

    A. It is reciprocal in nature.

    B. It is conducted covertly.

    C. It is conducted overtly.

    D. To gather CI information.

2. What are the methods of establishing an initial liaison contact?

    A. Cold approach.

    B. Letter of introduction.

    C. Personal introduction.

    D. All of the above.

3. What is the purpose of a 'liaison party?"

    A. Gather information from all sources at one time so that it may be compared.

    B. Introduce sources to one another.

    C. Encourage sources to give information by meeting in a more relaxed environment.

    D. Enhance the ease with which information or assistance can be obtained.

LESSON 1

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item	Correct Answer and Feedback
1.	A. It is reciprocal in nature. Page 1-2.
2.	D. All of the above. Page 1-4.
3.	D. Enhance the ease with which information or assistance can be obtained. Page 1-9.

LESSON 2

COORDINATE LIAISON IN SUPPORT OF
CI INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS

MOS Manual Task: 01-3354.06-0720
Critical Tasks: 301-340-2050

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn liaison planning; how to identify the types of agencies with which liaison should be conducted; the use of interpreters and liaison reporting.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTIONS: Describe the information and procedures required to coordinate liaison in support of CI investigations and operations.

CONDITIONS: You will be given narrative information and illustrations from applicable field manuals and army regulations.

STANDARDS: Coordinating liaison in support of CI investigations and operations will be in accordance with AR 380-5, AR 380-67, AR 381-10, AR 381-20, FM 34-52, FM 34-60A(S), and local SOPs.

REFERENCES: The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications:

AR 380-5
AR 380-67
AR 381-10
AR 381-20
FM 34-52
FM 34-60A(S)

INTRODUCTION

In this lesson you will learn:

- ★ How to plan for liaison.
- ★ Types of agencies with which liaison should be conducted.
- ★ Use of interpreters in liaison operations.
- ★ Liaison reporting.

PART A - LIAISON PLANNING

In planning for liaison, as in planning for any other CI operation, there are certain aspects that must be considered:

- ★ What are the reasons for or purpose of the liaison contact?
- ★ Is the contact to be made overtly or discretely?
- ★ What is the priority for information needed and time permitted to obtain it?
- ★ What are the restrictions, if any, or special instructions?

PART B - AGENCY TYPES

<u>Coordination Procedures</u>. In conventional combat operations, and especially in other than war operations, CI elements must maintain close coordination and liaison with various allied and US agencies. In many cases, CI personnel work with these elements in joint operations to support the combat commander. These liaisons efforts are no less important in peacetime. Liaison with appropriate agencies must be in progress before the outbreak of hostilities, if possible. Information and cooperation gained during this period can have a major impact on the effectiveness of both intelligence and combat operations.

As a rule, assistance is a two-way street. CI can provide these agencies with information and assistance and they, in turn, can often furnish the same to CI elements.

<u>National Agencies in CONUS</u>. Liaison activities at the national level with the military, Department of Justice, Treasury Department, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Personnel Management, Veterans Administration, and the Office of Selective Service are normally conducted at Department of Defense (DOD) or Department of the Army (DA) level.

<u>Local Agencies in CONUS</u>. Liaison with military, civilian, private agencies, and some national agencies at local levels, is usually accomplished by a Special Agent assigned to a local CI field element who has been designated by his unit to establish direct personal contact. In addition to federal agencies represented at the local level, other agencies that should be contacted include:

- ★ Military G2/S2, personnel sections, and provost marshals of units in the area.
- ★ Civilian agencies such as state and local police, sheriff's office, bureau of vital statistics, state crime commission, state adjutant general, state board of education, motor vehicle bureau, and local courts.

* Private agencies such as chambers of commerce, credit agencies, and public utilities.

Agencies Overseas. Liaison is essential to successful CI exploitation of information in overseas areas. Many US agencies will be found overseas alongside host country counterparts and allied forces. Personnel in liaison activities must be aware that, whether of an official or informal nature, liaison is always a two-way street. The person contacted by the Special Agent is usually from another US or foreign intelligence, law enforcement, or security agency. He expects to receive information from the Special Agent as well as to provide information.

CI personnel involved in liaison duties must be familiar with pertinent local directives and SOPs, ARs 380-5 and 381-20, and other applicable regulations. Liaison functions range in complexity from routine checks or exchange of documents to detailed coordination of joint CI special operations. The skilled liaison officer recognizes his limitations and brings in other CI personnel when the occasion demands.

US Official Agencies.

* US embassies, legations, or consulates.
* Other intelligence and tactical units in the area.
* Local judge advocate general offices.
* Intelligence advisors to host country military forces.
* Special forces units.
* Military assistance advisory groups.
* Labor services battalions.
* Offices of defense contractors.
* Civil affairs (CA) units or staff sections.
* Psychological operations (PSYOP) elements.
* Provost Marshal and US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) elements.

Host Country Liaison Contacts. Regardless of the status of US elements in the country, liaison personnel must exert all possible effort to establish rapport with their military and civilian counterpart agencies at national and local levels. Liaison must be conducted at various levels ranging from national-level host country agencies to private individuals who are in a position to provide information, assistance, and introductions.

Although quid-pro-quo governs most liaison activities, the LNO will sometimes find certain individuals who will cooperate voluntarily for reasons of their own. In many foreign countries, which are not as large as the US, national-level agencies extend much further into local communities than they do in the US. It would be virtually impossible within the confines of this subcourse to list all the foreign military, civil government, and private agencies and organizations which should be contacted.

Security agencies may be separate from intelligence agencies. Police, as a national-level agency, may extend down to the town or village level, or there may be additional levels of police agencies at the equivalent of state, county, township, and city levels. In many foreign countries, police have intelligence and CI missions in addition to those normally associated with law enforcement. In some countries, the police and usually another civilian agency perform the equivalent mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US.

Occasionally, the other agency will have a foreign intelligence mission in addition to its domestic duties. Particularly during peacetime and in a low intensity conflict (LIC), liaison should be established with the host country equivalent agencies of those listed above for CONUS.

City police frequently have subordinate divisions responsible for specific wards or subwards. Although liaison would not normally be conducted at the "police substation" level during tactical operations, the personnel in such stations are knowledgeable of any unusual or suspicious activities within their jurisdiction and may even know the bulk of the residents by sight. Therefore, it is advisable to establish liaison with the local office having jurisdiction in the area of US military installations. In some cases, it may be necessary for a LNO to establish contact with agencies on an "experimental" basis and elicit information concerning their mission and operations over a period of time to determine what information or assistance they can provide. Civilian agencies involved in handling refugees may be able to furnish information on the current whereabouts of individuals who have become CI suspects.

In most countries, there is some agency which issues the national identification card, operates some variety of residence registration, and maintains official family travel and passport records.

Many countries have a Maritime Police, roughly equivalent to the US Coast Guard. These agencies can frequently provide information concerning probable infiltration/exfiltration routes for enemy agents; are frequently the first to discover infiltration attempts; and are charged with watching for signs of hostile activities in coast and harbor areas.

Depending on the situation, the Liaison officer may support a large and diverse number of government agencies. These agencies or organizations may range from a single tactical unit to a major military command or other

government agency. The liaison officer may also be responsible for submitting liaison reports from these agencies to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Allied Forces. When US forces are engaged in tactical operations with allied forces, priority must be given to establishing close and continued liaison with the allied intelligence and security agencies.

Loyalties of Indigenous Personnel: Loyalties of indigenous personnel are of constant concern regardless of the type or level of hostilities. It is the responsibility of the G2, acting under the authority of the commander, to establish, monitor, and evaluate a personnel security program applicable to indigenous personnel regardless of how they interact with the command (post exchange clerks, barbers, conventional ammunition handlers, guards, clerical personnel, interpreters, investigators, and so on). A big part of the personnel security program is the conduct and adjudication of personnel security investigations.

CI is responsible for conducting all required personnel security investigations. The philosophy for determining the type of investigations necessary is: "The closer the indigenous personnel get to critical or sensitive information and material, the more extensive and intensive the investigations become." When access to classified information and material by indigenous personnel is contemplated, the provisions governing the use and administration of the Limited Access Authorization for non-US citizens, found in AR 380-67, must be strictly adhered to. Of course, there are factors which may impact on the way the above philosophy may be applied.

Lastly, a personnel security program must be supported by a suitable security education program, supervisory and monitoring programs, internal procedural controls, and a viable physical security program if the command expects to maximize the assessment of the loyalties of indigenous personnel and minimize the possibilities of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and criminal activities.

Attitudes of Indigenous Personnel toward US troops are a primary concern since civil affairs (CA) operations are developed to create or exploit local attitudes. Knowledge of attitudes will assist CI elements in assessing the area for CI operations. When such information is not available to CA, then CI can be of assistance, if it is well established in the area.

CI personnel must continuously monitor the populace for changing attitudes that may develop through enemy coercion and subversive efforts. They must also work with CA on programs designed to counter and/or neutralize any hostile threat. In the early stages of an insurgency, for example, CI will concentrate its monitoring mission primarily on subversion. The emphasis will gradually broaden toward espionage and sabotage if the insurgency moves into advanced phases. Students wanting to know more

about intelligence in low intensity conflicts should enroll in Subcourse IT 0468, Intelligence in Combating Terrorism.

Recruitment. Through contact with civilian organizations, leaders, and political enemies of hostile governments, CA can compile rosters or spot possible enemy infiltrators. These sources can also provide information on or identify individuals for screening by CI or PSYOP for use as:

★ Interpreters.

★ Informants.

★ CI special operations operatives.

★ Specialized craftsmen, technicians, or laborers.

Civil Affairs. CA provides maximum support to CI in the detection and prevention of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla aid. CA also supports CI by:

★ Identification of known or suspected hostile agents, collaborators, or sympathizers.

★ Prevention of local publication of information or opinion detrimental to the military force.

★ Control of credit, food, clothing, medical supplies, and related items that may be used to support guerrilla activities.

★ House-to-house searches for contraband which may yield persons, documents, or material of CI interest.

★ Searches for documents of intelligence interest.

★ Placement of administrative surveillance and restrictions on the movement of persons-suspected of collaborating with guerrilla forces.

★ Destruction, surveillance, or control of abandoned mines; caves; isolated rural buildings, haystacks or similar crop collections that are potential hiding places or shelter spots for dissidents.

★ Collection, evaluation, and interpretation of police statistics on insurgency crimes such as recruiting or acts of terrorism that may relate to enemy sabotage, espionage, or subversive activities.

Close contacts and working relationships between civilians and CA personnel result not only in valuable intelligence sources and material, but also opportunities to exploit unfriendly persons and groups. CA

personnel must be discreet in dealing with civilians. Information provided to civilians should be screened.

Indigenous persons and agencies should be kept under surveillance for indications of disaffection.

<u>Collection Potential of CA Personnel</u>. CA personnel in day-by-day operations deal with people, equipment, and documents--all primary sources of information or intelligence. CA units are able to provide direct support in the procurement of essential facilities, equipment, and personnel recruitment. Normally, when persons with information of possible value are discovered, they are referred promptly to appropriate intelligence personnel for exploitation. Sources that CA personnel are likely to find include:

★ Refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons who may be interned or otherwise come under CA control or sponsorship.

★ Civilians associated with the Army.

★ Political enemies of the hostile regime.

★ Leaders of fraternal, civic, religious, or patriotic organizations.

★ Government documents, libraries, or archives.

★ Newspapers or periodical files.

★ Industrial and commercial records.

★ Persons employed in recreational areas.

★ Political prisoners of the hostile regime.

★ Technical equipment, blueprints, or plans.

<u>Other Contributions</u>: Support activities in which CA can make significant contributions to the CI effort include:

★ Collection of all types of intelligence for use at different command levels.

★ Procurement.

★ Recruitment.

Assistance to CI include the following activities:

★ Screening civilian officials.

* Obtaining information about sabotage.

* Detecting transmission of information and supplies to enemy forces, unfriendly partisans, or guerrillas through illegal activities and communication routes and by audits of supplies in warehouses and of controlled merchandise in stores.

* Locating and detaining war criminals and enemy military personnel posing as civilians through contacts with the populace.

<u>Military Police</u>. CI and Military Police (MP) units have a mutual interest in the following areas (primary responsibility may be vested in either unit):

* Intelligence. MP develop police intelligence based on criminal and operational intelligence. Criminal intelligence pertains to individuals and organized crime activities, while operational intelligence refers to security and other MP activities. CI and MP units will frequently develop information of mutual interest which should be shared at the lowest practical level consistent with command policy on coordination.

* Subversion. MP are concerned with the impact of organized crime on the war effort as well as the ties that top criminals might have with local political leaders, political parties, labor unions, legitimate businesses, and government agencies.

* Sabotage. MP are concerned with terrorism through sabotage as a criminal act as well as a coordinated enemy effort.

* Refugee Screening. MP have the mission for control and evacuation of refugees. With the assistance from the MP, CI can play a large role in spotting hostile intelligence agents, saboteurs, subversives, and other dissident groups using the cover of a refugee.

* Rear Operations. Both MP and CI can develop offensive and defensive measures in the rear operations area to deny the enemy information and materials for hostile actions.

* Harbor Security. MP can organize or conduct patrols, security surveys or surveillance of suspected criminal groups in harbor areas.

* Circulation Control. MP can devise registration and identification systems, set curfews, establish checkpoints, devise a pass system, and collect and analyze the modus operandi of criminal and hostile elements.

★ Physical Security. UP set up physical security measures including but not limited to: barriers, sentry dogs, alarm and anti-intrusion systems, guards, restricted areas, and perimeter lighting of key installations.

★ Border Security. MP are responsible for setting up anti-infiltration methods designed to keep the border secure from infiltration by enemy, neutral, and criminal elements.

★ Civil Disturbance. MP develop police intelligence and conduct mob, riot, and crime control measures during civil disturbances.

★ Others. There are other duties that require coordination between MP and Ct elements such as an espionage incident, the investigation of a crime, raids, cordons and searches and mobile and static checkpoints for MP control or CI spot checks for infiltrators. The above indicates the need for reciprocal intelligence and coordination between MP and CI elements. Such reciprocal intelligence can be obtained formally through staff elements or on a liaison-type basis between operations officers or liaison personnel.

<u>Psychological Operations (PSYOP).</u> PSYOP have interrogators who obtain information for attitude assessment and analysis. They also do target vulnerability analysis from enemy prisoners of war (EPW), detainees, or the local populace. PSYOP are geared to assist the following areas of CI interest:

★ Consolidation Operations are directed toward the people of liberated or occupied areas to assist military operations and promote cooperation.

★ Populace and Resource Control Programs include the announcement of and reasons for restrictions placed on the populace and education for programs such as resettlement and clear-and-hold-operations.

★ Reeducation is directed at EPW and civilian detainees to neutralize their hostile attitudes and reorient them toward the US.

★ Area Estimates are necessary for PSYOP and to assist the CI data base.

★ Media Analysis is necessary to discover clandestine printing presses and other mass media subversive activities.

★ Black and Grey Propaganda consists of covert PSYOP that do not disclose the source or their identity.

★ Subversive Propaganda is of interest to CA, PSYOP, and CI elements to plan countermeasures and to provide leads for CI.

★ Others include objectives such as a nation building, cordon and search assistance, and the referral of individuals to CI, who have CI special operations potential.

Intelligence Elements. Since CI units are charged with overt liaison functions between local police, intelligence, and security organizations, other intelligence units engaged in classified activities may also use the services of CI for liaison activities.

Other MI elements that can assist CI are:

★ Imagery Analyst (IA). IAs provide assistance in counter-imagery intelligence analysis. IA can interpret imagery for briefings and debriefings of sources.

★ Order of Battle (OB). 08 personnel can keep CI updated on such things as changes of unit designations, compositions, and dispositions.

★ Technical Intelligence (TI). TI personnel can keep CI advised on changes in equipment and equipment capabilities.

★ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT assets provide assistance in assessing the SIGINT threat. SIGINT can assist CI with information from intercept, direction finding, and analysis of enemy communication, to include clandestine transmissions.

PART C - RECORDS

The CI specialist must know when, what, where, who and why records are maintained in the area in which he operates. The initial orientation of a LNO upon his assignment to the unit should stress thorough familiarity with records.

Meticulous examination of records to confirm or refute a suspect's story is very often the best means of breaking an enemy intelligence agent's cover story.

Methods of Gaining Access to Records. Most records, both US and host country, will be available to the LNO on official request. Access will depend on the ability of the investigator to obtain discreet cooperation of the custodian of records. Such cooperation will be enhanced by mature professional conduct and attitude.

Data Reliability. The possibility of intentional deception or false information in official and unofficial records must always be considered. The fact that data are recorded on a form does not ensure their reliability. Many biographical items are repetitions of unsubstantiated information provided by the subject himself. Reliability of records will vary according to the area, the status of the agency or organization keeping the records, and other intangibles. For example, records in industrialized countries will be more extensive and reliable than those in underdeveloped countries. Until experience with a certain type of record has established a basis for evaluating reliability, it is necessary to treat such information with skepticism.

Value of Negative Information. In CI investigations, the absence of a record is often just at- important as the existence of a record.

Information of CI Interest. The types and amount of information available will vary remarkably in the area of operation. Regardless of the area, it is important for the LNO to be aware of the types of information he may be required to obtain. Some of the major liaison contacts that often will be of value for information or leads are:

Police and Security Agencies. Local, regional, and national police agencies of most countries maintain personality files on criminals, suspects, victims, and others who come to the attention of police in connection with actual or alleged crimes. Police records, often including photographs and fingerprint cards, make them particularly valuable and more reliable than comparable records of other agencies. Police and security agency files are usually divided into subcategories. It is important for the LNO to become familiar with the system to ensure all pertinent agencies and sections are contacted. The LNO should attempt to obtain information on potential threat and hostile intelligence operations and organizations.

Intelligence Agencies. The reliability and validity of information obtained will depend on the competency of the particular agencies contacted and the professionalism of the LNO. In many cases, these agencies will furnish only sanitized information with all references to the original source of the information carefully deleted. The LNO must use care in asking questions to determine the reliability of the information and the original source, since most agencies will be extremely reluctant to risk compromising their sources and methods.

The LNO must also be aware he may sometimes receive US-furnished information which has been processed through the host country agency. In some cases, this information may be furnished in good faith; in other cases, it may be an attempt to appear to provide something without actually doing so. It is vital the liaison officer be familiar with the mission of each agency so he knows what types of information and assistance each can provide.

When setting up and coordinating combined investigations and operations in overseas areas, a certain amount of collection on allied agencies is required to determine their resources and whether their capabilities are compatible with the needs of the US unit.

In case of unilateral US operations, it may be necessary to determine if the host country agency has any indication of the operation. Obviously, the latter type of liaison visit takes much more skill and finesse than, say, establishing a friendly attitude on the part of the local US or host country police records office.

<u>Citizenship</u>. Immigration, naturalization, passport, and similar records contain data on citizenship. In most instances, independent investigation has been made to verify background information in such records. As such, they are generally more reliable than other types. The records of official and private refugee welfare and assistance agencies will also have extensive details on citizenship status. Refugee records (particularly those of private welfare groups) should be used with care because they have proved to be unreliable in the past.

<u>International Travel</u>. Access to international travel records is important to CI overseas. Records of interest include customs records, passport and visa applications, passenger manifests on commercial carriers, currency exchange files, transient residence registrations, private and government travel agency records, and frontier control agency (for example, police) files.

<u>Military Service</u>. Records of current and past members of the armed services of most countries are detailed and usually accurate. Access to foreign military records in overseas areas may be very difficult. Where it is not possible to examine official records, leads or pertinent information may be obtained from unofficial unit histories and similar documents that have been published commercially and also from files of veterans' organizations. Since military service is a convenient means of accounting for periods of time spent in intelligence activities or periods of imprisonment, it is frequently a critical time in dealing with suspected enemy agents. Special efforts should be made to locate some record that will either confirm or deny an individual's service in a particular unit or the existence of that unit at the time and place he claims to have served. OB and personality files of various intelligence services may also be helpful.

<u>Miscellaneous Organizations</u>. Many organizations have records and information that may be of value. Examples are labor unions, sport groups, social, scientific, cultural, and subversive organizations. Although it is important for the LNO to consider such organizations when seeking sources of information, he must be thoroughly familiar with the organization before attempting to exploit it. Organizations are often set up as front groups or cover vehicles for hostile intelligence operations.

PART D - INTERPRETERS IN LIAISON OPERATIONS

Like most US military operations, the majority of liaison missions are conducted on foreign soil. It would be a rare situation in which a CI unit would find itself in a foreign country with all of the language-qualified personnel to accomplish its mission using only organic personnel resources. Although direct communication with liaison sources and investigative contacts are preferable, the chronic shortage of qualified linguists requires the use of interpreters to overcome the language barrier.

The following are problems inherent to the use of interpreters:

★ It is more difficult to establish rapport without being able to speak directly to the source.

★ Conversations are more time-consuming, normally taking over twice the time required than if the LNO is a skilled linguist. It is much more difficult to concentrate on conversations due to lapse of time between a remark and reply.

★ Additional security risks are posed because the interpreter will become aware of intelligence requirements, sources, methods, and information and may obtain much classified information during the liaison visit.

Using Experienced Interpreters. Although it may be necessary to recruit interpreters in a new area of operations, established MI units normally have interpreters already assigned and are familiar with the duties they will be called upon to perform. In these units, the only time an agent will be called upon to train an interpreter is when a new one has been hired.

Frequently, specific interpreters are assigned to work solely for a specific LNO or are assigned to a section which is charged with liaison responsibilities. If several such interpreters are available, the LNO will normally use the interpreter with whom he can most comfortably work. In some situations, however, specific interpreters may be accustomed to working with specific agencies and have become acquainted with personnel, mission, and functions of these agencies. In that case, the LNO should use those interpreters in dealing with the agencies where the interpreter is known and trusted. Whether the LNO chooses the interpreter he will work with or has one assigned to him, it is important to realize they must function as a team. Any personality conflicts must be resolved by mutual agreement, since they may have to spend many hours in one another's company. The interpreter is one of the LNOs most likely sources of cultural information. In this light, the first hint a LNO may have of a verbal blunder may be when the interpreter suddenly develops "difficulty" in understanding or translating a comment directed at a liaison source.

Because information is frequently passed orally and is sometimes extensive, the interpreter can add his memory to that of the LNO in preparing reports. He may also be able to clarify fine points of information misunderstood or misconstrued by the LNO during the actual liaison contact.

It is advisable to review the draft reports with the interpreter to ensure accuracy. In some cases, the interpreter may have gained considerable experience in preparing various types of reports.

Desired Capabilities. To be effective, an interpreter should possess certain qualities or capabilities:

- ★ Fluency in English, as well as the language of the source. Both oral and written fluency is important.

- ★ Ability to adjust his personality to that of the source and the liaison officer. This is particularly important where social caste systems exist. The interpreter, who may be a separate class from that of the source, must be able to make adjustments in his attitudes toward the source.

Interpreter Selection. The availability of interpreters will depend on a number of factors. These include: the status of US forces, war or peace conditions, tactical and strategic considerations, and the availability of trained US linguists. It is considered preferable to use US military or civilian personnel as interpreters. In most cases, however, it will be necessary to employ local nationals.

In tactical situations, the host country will sometimes assign English-speaking active duty military personnel to US units as interpreters. When using these personnel, the LNO must be aware that their primary loyalty is to their own country and that host country intelligence agencies may bring pressure on them to report on US intelligence activities. For this reason, regardless of the presence or absence of hostilities, it is preferable that civilians be hired specifically for intelligence units if local nationals must be used.

The actual hiring action is normally done through the supporting US civilian personnel office, in conjunction with applicant screening by the US intelligence unit. In selecting an interpreter, the following factors must be considered:

- ★ Local Dialect. In addition to the usual language capabilities mentioned above, the interpreter should have a good understanding of local dialects, slang expressions, and military and security jargon.

★ Personality. If possible, the personality of the interpreter should mirror that of the LNO. The interpreter should be capable of arousing feelings of respect and confidence.

★ Area Knowledge. Undoubtedly the greater the knowledge of the area, the greater value the interpreter is to the LNO. However, it is advisable the interpreter not be a resident of the immediate area in which he will work. This is to prevent the interpreter from using his position for his own benefit by taking revenge on his enemies or providing advantages to his friends. Conversely, if the interpreter was born and reared in the area, he may have associates who are in positions to bring pressure on him. Interpreters who have been employed in one location for an extended period have frequently become established and respected residents. While this would appear to be a contradiction of the rule against using area residents, the circumstances of their employment and long service, leading to their familiarity with the area, prominent residents, and their acquaintance with longtime contacts, usually offset the possible disadvantages.

★ Reputation. The interpreter must be honest and free from notoriety among the local inhabitants. His reputation or standing in the community should be such he will not be intimidated by those of higher rank and standing.

★ Discretion. The interpreter is essentially an extension of the LNO whose activities may reflect on the LNO's reputation. Additionally, the interpreter must not give in to the temptation to impress others with a display of the information and knowledge he has gleaned through his duties.

★ Continued Availability. The interpreter should not be subject to conscription into the armed forces or to other types of obligatory duties which could make him unavailable for continued use.

<u>Access to classified and/or Sensitive Information/Material</u>: The solution to this factor lies in determining the probability of an indigenous interpreter gaining access to classified information/material during the conduct of his duties. If such a probability exists, no matter how slight, the interpreter should be brought under the provisions of the Limited Access Authorization for non-US citizens found in AR 380-67. This Limited Access Program will provide satisfactory safeguards against the interpreter inadvertently gaining access to classified information, while simultaneously providing a system for periodically assessing the interpreter's loyalty. If there is no probability of access to classified information and material occurring, a lesser personnel security investigation must be selected as well as a suitable system for periodically assessing the Interpreter's loyalties.

Interpreter Training. Generally speaking, special schools for interpreters are not feasible. Consequently, the LNO will be responsible for properly orienting interpreters as to the nature of duties, standards of conduct, techniques to be used, and any other requirements the LNO considers necessary.

Special attention should be given to language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreter is expected to be used. Accuracy of translation should be stressed.

The procedures to be used must be adapted to the interpreter's job. The procedures discussed below need only be considered the first time the interpreter is teamed with the LNO.

They need not be considered again if the interpreter and the LNO work together as a team.

The LNO must also accomplish the following:

- ★ Determine the interpreter's personality, linguistic abilities, and general qualifications. He should accustom himself to the interpreter's accent and determine what problems the interpreter has in understanding his own accent.

- ★ Before the initial visit with a source, discuss with the interpreter possible opening conversational topics. Before subsequent liaison visits, discuss similar topics and the type of information he hopes to obtain during the visit. The LNO should have both social and operational discussions in mind before leaving to see a liaison source.

Interpreter Use. It is advisable to begin each liaison visit on a social level with casual conversation before progressing to operational matters. The LNO should avoid embarrassing gaps in the conversation that occur during investigative interviews. One of the LNOs tasks is to "sell" himself. Although it may sometimes be necessary to ask the interpreter for a clarification of a translation, the LNO should use care in engaging in any off-hand conversations. Many contacts understand English but will not use the language for fear of making a mistake and embarrassing themselves. It is best to assume that the contact understands at least some English.

- ★ Ensure the interpreter understand he is the "right hand" of the LNO and, although very important to the liaison, he must guard against any tendency to inject his own questions, ideas, or personality. He must be willing to accept a subordinate role in the actual liaison. He must permit the LNO to carry out the conversation and receive and evaluate the responses. The interpreter should use

direct translations of the statements made by the principals and avoid such expressions as “He wants to know if you...” or “He said to tell you that....”

★ Select either the alternate or simultaneous interpretation method to be used. The choice has to be made on the basis of the LNOs evaluation of the interpreter's ability and personal characteristics; grammatical similarities between English and the second language; and the source's personality. Each method has advantages, disadvantages and peculiarities the LNO must recognize.

In the <u>alternate</u> method, the LNO speaks in entire sentences, or even paragraphs, and then pauses to permit the interpretation of all that has been said. This method requires the interpreter to have a good memory. It has the disadvantages of making the interpreter's presence more obvious thereby breaking down the desired eye-to-eye contact between the LNO and the source. It does, however, allow the interpreter to rephrase statements to ensure better understanding in the second language. This is significant when the other language has a sentence structure that differs from the language used by the LNO.

In the <u>simultaneous</u> method, the interpreter speaks right along with the LNO, keeping up as closely as possible, usually a phrase or so behind. With this method, the highly skilled interpreter can more closely follow, and give exact attitudes, connotations, and fine shades of meaning conveyed by the source or the LNO. Simultaneous interpreting enhances rapport between the source and the LNO. It promotes attentive listening since there will be no long pauses during which the two principals are not involved. Simultaneous interpreting has the disadvantage of greater error, especially where there is a difference in sentence structure between the languages. It requires a high degree of proficiency in both languages and is the more difficult method to use.

<u>Other Considerations</u>. The LNO should speak directly to the source and maintain eye contact with him to hold his attention. (There is a natural tendency to look at whoever is speaking. The LNO should resist turning to listen to the interpretation of the source remarks and hold the source's attention as much as possible.) He should speak slowly and clearly in simple, direct, and concise English. Avoid slang or other obvious expressions, peculiar to a region or district, which may confuse the interpreter. If the source and interpreter begin an extensive conversation or argument, the LNO should put an immediate stop to it.

Occasionally, the interpreter and the source may begin a conversation of their own. While the interpreter's main function is to serve as a "translation machine," there are times when the LNO should be discreet about interrupting. Much of this will depend on the reliability of the interpreter and the personality of the source. Obviously, it is the LNOs

job to collect information and the interpreter should not be allowed to branch out on his own. Occasionally, however, sources may provide information to the interpreter and ask him not to translate it; The source may have a variety of reasons for doing this: he may wish to limit the amount of information provided, he may consider he is doing the interpreter a favor by allowing him to gain credit for developing the information, or he may have unknown reasons of his own. The interpreter should impart this information to the LNO only after they leave the source and when it is safe to do so. Doctrine in using interpreters for interrogations calls for discouraging the interpreter from engaging in conversations of his own. Liaison, however, presents a different situation. While the LNO should not allow the interpreter to take charge of the liaison visit, it may sometimes be advantageous to allow the interpreter to exploit his rapport with contacts.

If the interpreter appears to hold conversations on his own and does not subsequently provide an explanation, the LNO must press him for the details. Unless information of value is being obtained by these private conversations, the interpreter should be told to keep them to a minimum. In any case, the interpreter should be debriefed after the meeting and advised not to withhold any information from the LNO.

The LNO has the responsibility of evaluating the interpreter's capability and reliability, even for interpreters who may have been employed for long periods. If at all possible, the LNO should record, on magnetic tape, translations for review, comparison, and evaluation at a higher echelon by an American fluent in the source's language. It is extremely difficult to make a tape recording during a liaison contact (1) without the interpreter knowing of it, (2) in an area not under US control, (3) without invoking a negative reaction from the source, if the recorder is discovered, and (4) without running afoul of regulations governing the recording of conversations by MI and MP/CID personnel.

While the overt tape recording method is possible during foreign national subject interviews or interrogations, the individuals being interviewed frequently speak sufficient English to preclude the necessity of using an interpreter. The following examples can be used to determine whether or not an interpreter is doing his job without resorting to the extreme use of clandestine recording:

★ Do responses from source sometimes bear no resemblance to your remarks such as: ("Nice day, isn't it?' "Oh, about ten-thirty.") ?

★ Does new information surface during review of reports—information the interpreter “forgot" to translate?

★ Are there frequent differences between your reports and similar reports from other offices?

- ★ Have you determined if the interpreter has a problem understanding your particular brand of English? How about your understanding of his version of English?

- ★ Are interpretations significantly shorter than the speech represents? Is this fairly frequent?

Making the recording carries some risks and is a last resort. The judge advocate general should be consulted prior to making any concealed recordings. As another alternative, use an American linguist during a contact to evaluate the interpreter without the interpreter's knowledge. This would have to be an individual unknown to the interpreter since the "interpreter's Mafia" normally know all American linguists, at least by reputation.

Rapport with the interpreter is vital. The interpreter must accept the fact he works for the LNO. It is not his position to make decisions, but rather to act as a communication medium. By the same token, the LNO must realize the interpreter is a professional assistant and should be treated accordingly.

<u>Controlling The Interpreter</u>. The LNO makes certain the interpreter performs his duties correctly and does not usurp the LNOs prerogatives. The latter is responsible for the liaison and, therefore, remains in complete control. It is the LNO who asks the questions; receives the answers; and evaluates the information and the source. The LNO uses the interpreter as a means of overcoming a language barrier. Guidelines for control include:

- ★ The interpreter refrains from asking any questions of his own other than those necessary to clarify a statement before translating it. He does not paraphrase statements any more than is necessary for an accurate translation.

- ★ The interpreter never intimidates or berates the source, engages in behavior that will lower the prestige of the LNO, or adversely affects the liaison mission.

- ★ The interpreter never holds back information given him by the source.

- ★ The liaison officer never criticizes or admonishes his interpreter in the presence of the source. Criticism is made in private to avoid lowering the prestige of the interpreter and impair his effectiveness.

PART E - LIAISON REPORTS

Reporting liaison activity will be in accordance with local unit SOP, which may range from an oral briefing to a formal liaison contact report.

Information collected during liaison activities must be forwarded to higher levels of command to be of use. This reporting may take various forms, such as investigative Memorandums for Record (IMFRs), intelligence information reports (IIRs), spot reports, contact reports, memorandums for record and so on. The type of information being reported and the local SOP will determine what type of report format is used. Procedures for preparing these reports are beyond the scope of this subcourse. As stated previously, LNOs in overseas areas are sometimes tasked to collect specific information. When submitting a report in response to these collection requirements, the LNO will normally cite the requirement being answered to ensure it is provided to the requester. Occasionally, the LNO will obtain usable information for which he has no specific collection requirement. In these cases, the information should be forwarded as an Initiative report.

Report Types. Information obtained from liaison with US agencies, both in CONUS and overseas, is frequently limited by various regulations. The majority of this information deals with coordination and mutual assistance. Frequently, these reports are limited to recording discussions, agreements, decisions, and concurrence or nonconcurrence. In many cases, a Memorandum for Record is prepared for information to be retained by the originating office, and a contact report is used to forward information to a higher echelon.

The amount of information that can be maintained on a US person is severely limited. A US person, as defined in AR 381-10, is "A citizen of the US, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association organized in the US or substantially composed of US citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation incorporated in the US."

Restrictions on the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning US persons apply both in CONUS and overseas. Generally, information on a US person liaison source may be retained only when it pertains directly to operational matters and was volunteered by the liaison source. Information on non-US persons, collected overseas, may be collected, stored, and disseminated with fewer restrictions. For instance, the information a nor-US liaison source is fond of cats and enjoys discussing them would be a permissible entry. A similar entry concerning a US person (either In CONUS or overseas) would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and is prohibited. Permissible entries in both cases would include such information as name, position, contact procedures (for example, by appointment only, at 1500 hours each Wednesday, on a walk-in basis, and so on), and assistance previously rendered. Similar operational information collected from foreign sources is sometimes submitted via an IIR "DD Form 173); most often in electrical message formats. The IIR is designed to transmit information to the DIA, for dissemination by DIA to user agencies and for analysis by DIA personnel. The IIR is also frequently used to disseminate the information to supported commands.

Oral Briefing. An oral briefing consists of the LNO briefing his supervisor on the results of a liaison contact.

Memorandum for Record. This is an informal memo on the results of a liaison contact which remains in the local office files.

Spot Report. Spot reports are used to transmit information concerning incidents of such importance as to warrant immediate dissemination. They are submitted so the responsible command and, if appropriate, to Headquarters, DA. Some incidents, such as Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations reports, have specified spot report formats.

The following is the format for a general-purpose CI spot report:

- Name and location of the area, establishment, organization, individual(s), materials or equipment involved.
- Specific nature or significance of the incident.
- Time and date of occurrence or discovery of the incident.
- Immediate and contributing causes, including full identification of individual(s) responsible, if known.
- Evidence of sabotage, espionage or criminal subversion, if applicable.
- Estimate of the significance of the incident.
- Action being taken or contemplated by the reporting agency.

Spot reports are normally submitted by the fastest secure means possible, usually by electrical message. Only rarely, when the importance of speed outweighs the need for security, will nonsecure means, such as telephones, be used. The addressees for spot reports will be specified by local SOP. Interim spot reports containing initial, fragmentary information may be submitted if developing full information would take more than nominal time. As further information is developed, further spot reports, amplifying the initial spot report, should be submitted. Subsequent spot reports should reference the initial report and be sequentially numbered.

Liaison Contact Report. Unlike those reports used to transmit information obtained during the conduct of liaison, the liaison contact report (LCR) is used to maintain continuity of liaison operations. LCRs are used in overseas areas to report liaison activities with foreign agencies, organizations, and individuals.

A dossier should be compiled on each non-US person source, particularly when LCRs or similar reports are submitted. The dossier should contain all intelligence reports based on information furnished by the source, LCRs, and biographic information. These dossiers are maintained in two copies; the field dossier and one at the source control office. A suggested format is shown on page 35. When used, the actual format and instructions for completion will be specified by local command SOP. Dossiers WILL NOT BE MAINTAINED ON US PERSON(S) LIAISON SOURCES.

The primary purpose of a LCR is to ensure continuity of liaison operations by providing information concerning an individual liaison source to future LNOs who will deal with him. A secondary purpose is to provide headquarters elements with statistical and administrative information. LCRs are prepared in two copies: original is forwarded to a specified element and the other is retained at the preparing office. Instructions for completing the LCR are as follows:

- ★ SUBJECT. May be identified by name, position and organization, as determined by local SOP. If the subject is an individual, he is referred to as source. The source is normally clearly identified in LCRs but may be identified by a code number in spot reports, IIRs, or other intelligence documents prepared and forwarded out of the local office.

- ★ DATE. The date the report is prepared.

- ★ REFERENCE(S). As a minimum, it will contain the date and report number of the last LCR submitted concerning the source. Any reference to documents or material previously submitted by the source can be included.

- ★ REPORT NUMBER. Normally assigned by the calendar year sequence format, this number is used to refer to the LCR. For example, the first LCR for the Camp Howze Resident Office would be CHRO-89-001, the tenth would be CHRO-89-010, and so on. Normally this number will indicate the total number of liaison contacts made by that element since the beginning of the year. To prevent using the same report number more than once, a contact report number list should be maintained. As each number is used, an annotation is made indicating the liaison source that particular report refers to and the date of the LCR.

- ★ PROJECT NUMBER. The project number under which the specific liaison contact is funded and/or authorized.

- ★ PARAGRAPH 1. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONTACT. Date and time (from-to), place contact occurred, reason for liaison contact, persons present during contact. It should be noted "Persons Present" refers to principals and does not include waitresses, busboys, secretaries, and so on. LNOs should not make inappropriate inquiries as to

names of persons accompanying the source if the source has not introduced his companions. In these instances, physical descriptions of persons present will have to do until more is known about them.

★ PARAGRAPH 2. OPERATIONAL MATTERS. A chronology of the contact. Normally, operational information included in a report need only be mentioned or summarized. Other operational information, such as leads, fragmentary information, and so on, should be reported in detail. The LCR can serve as storage until sufficient information is collected to justify a report. It can also be used to stimulate the LNOs memory to ensure he follows up on such information during future contacts.

★ Obviously, it is preferable to report perishable, fragmentary information rather than waiting for more details. Also included in this paragraph would be information received from the source that was not already used in the report. Such information may be extracted from various LCRs at higher echelon, then analyzed, combined, and subsequently used to produce multi-source reports. A key point to remember about information in this paragraph is that only facts are included. No opinions are offered.

★ PARAGRAPH 3. PERSONALIA. Biographic information concerning source. This includes information required for the DD Form 1396-1, (C) Biographic Data Form (U), concerning the source, his personality, idiosyncrasies, sense of humor or lack thereof, types of information the source may be willing to provide, topics which should be avoided, his organization, and so on. Only include biographic data not previously reported.

★ PARAGRAPH 4. PRODUCTION. Indicate reports, by report number and title, submitted as a result of that particular contact. Just refer to the document because you have already covered the new facts in paragraph 2. Types of reports that might be cited are IIRs, spot reports, and IMFRs.

★ PARAGRAPH 5. FINANCE AND LOGISTICS. Indicate incentives used, intelligence contingency funds, source's funds, or personal funds. Cash expenditures are explained in paragraph 6.

★ PARAGRAPH 6. COMMENTS. Any comments the LNO feels should be included go in this paragraph. In paragraph 2, only facts were included. Here, the LNO can include his opinions, feelings, and so on. For example, "Mr. X wouldn't look me in the eye during the meeting making me feel he may be trying to break off contact.”

★ SIGNATURE. Signature, typed name, and duty station of LNOs.

★ REVIEWER'S COMMENTS.

LCRs are normally prepared in two copies. The original copy is forwarded to the source control office and the second retained in the field dossier. The source control office at higher echelon will, many times, make comments in this section about the mount of time being spent, quantity of funds expended, or quality of information received. A copy of the LCR with the reviewer's comments is frequently returned to LNO for his future guidance.

CLASSIFICATION

LIAISON CONTACT REPORT

SUBJECT: DATE:

REFERENCE(S): REPORT NUMBER:

PROJECT NUMBER:

INCLUDE WARNING NOTICE HERE

1. ( ) CIRCUMSTANCES OF CONTACT:

   a. Purpose:

   b. Date, Time, and Place of Meeting:

   c. Persons Present:

2. ( ) OPERATIONAL MATTERS:

3. ( ) PERSONALIA:

4. ( ) PRODUCTION:

5. ( ) FINANCE/LOGISTICS:

6. ( ) COMMENTS:

(signature)
AGENT'S NAME
TITLE
UNIT

REVIEWER'S COMMENTS: ( )

CLASSIFIED BY:
DECLASSIFY ON:

CLASSIFICATION

Liaison Cards. One of the most convenient methods of maintaining information for continuity of liaison operations is by use of the liaison card files. It is preferable to have a card on each organization contacted to provide a quick reference concerning locations, organizations, missions, and similar liaison-related information. Card files can also be used to maintain information on individual liaison sources.

When recording information concerning overseas non-US person liaison sources, considerably more personal data may be retained. The following information should be considered for such non-US person overseas liaison sources:

★ Name, rank, and position.

★ Organization.

★ Place of duty.

★ Telephone number and method of contact.

★ Type and level of cooperation provided; reason for maintaining contact.

★ Personal characteristics, likes and dislikes, sense of humor or lack thereof, preferences on food and drink, worries, favorite topics of conversation, and so on.

★ Marital status and information on spouse and children (if any).

Liaison Contact Files. As in all intelligence activities, a record of information collected, methods used and results obtained must be maintained in a recoverable form. In the case of CI liaison, this material is organized and retained in "liaison contact files." At a minimum, a card file on the various organizations and agencies should be maintained. In overseas areas where LCRs are used, a file or dossier is maintained on each liaison source. This file will contain all of the LCRs on that particular individual and copies of all reports concerning information he furnished. If a liaison source is transferred to another LNOs area of responsibility, the dossier should be sent directly to that LNO.

Normally, a notice is sent to the headquarters element maintaining the master files so the change can be registered to ensure there is no confusion concerning the source's identity. If the source's new assignment is unknown, the file Is sent to the same headquarters element where it is retained until requested the next time contact is reestablished with the source. Because the source may return to the area on a future assignment, the Information on the liaison cards is placed in an inactive file and retained for possible future reference.

LESSON 2

Practice Exercise

The following items will test your knowledge of the material covered in the lesson. There is only one correct answer for each item. When you have completed the exercise, check your answers with the answer key that follows. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that part of the lesson which contains the portion involved.

1. Under what circumstances should the same local national interpreter be used repeatedly?

    A. When he can fill collection requirements for you.

    B. When no qualified US interpreters are available.

    C. When he is known and trusted by your source.

    D. When he was originally a resident of the area.

2. When the interpreter rephrases statements to ensure better, understanding in the second language, which interpretation method is being used?

    A. Alternate.

    B. Combined.

    C. Simultaneous.

    D. Technical.

3. What other intelligence elements can assist CI?

    A. Imagery analyst.

    B. Order of battle.

    C. Signals Intelligence.

    D. All of the above.

LESSON 2

PRACTICE EXERCISE

ANSWER KEY AND FEEDBACK

Item	Correct Answer and Feedback
1.	C. When he is known and trusted by your source. Page 2-13.
2.	A. Alterate. Page 2-17.
3.	D. All of the above. Page 2-10.